The present article analyses the plural forms occurring in 
Introduction
The plural forms attested in Genesis 1:26 ‫,נעשה(‬ ‫בצלמנו‬ and ‫,)כדמותנו‬ 3:5 ‫)ידעי(‬ and 3:22 ( ‫כאחד‬ ‫ממנו‬ ), which might relate to God, were discussed within the framework of the Jewish tradition. The canonical form of Genesis 1-3 was the final result of a long process in which strata of various traditions were interacting with each other until they solidified into the document which was received and transmitted as canonical. Notwithstanding a complex history of redaction which can be reconstructed only partially, the ultimate text of the narratives found in Genesis 1-3 seems to be coherent in literary terms and thus, the aforementioned plural forms that occur in Genesis 1:26, 3:5, 3:22 might be studied together. Naturally, there were also other passages in the Tanakh such as Genesis 11:7 ( ‫נרדה‬ ‫ונבלה‬ ), 20:13 ‫)התעו(‬ or 35:7 ‫)נגלו(‬ which contained the plural forms potentially referring to God but these passages could not be reviewed in the present article.
Since the mediaeval Jewish exegesis of these forms drew upon the early Jewish interpretation, which was recorded in the ancient Aramaic and Greek translations of the Scripture and reflected in the Midrashic and Talmudic literature, the present article also examines this hermeneutical root of the Jewish exposition of these phenomena. Although the dating of the Targumim and Midrashim is debatable, the author of the present article does not presume that this ancient Jewish literature was created primarily to combat emerging forms of early Christian theology.
1 Rather, this corpus aimed to preserve and to elucidate the Jewish tradition in the face of the profound challenges to which Judaism needed to respond in that period.
Comments on the plural forms made by Philo of Alexandria 2 were intentionally excluded from the present enquiry though they demonstrated that such forms challenged
Textual Study and Ancient Translations
The Hebrew text of Genesis 1:26, 3:5 and 3:22 was uniform in the Masoretic and Samaritan 8 versions as far as the plural forms are concerned. From a literary perspective, in Genesis 1:26-27 singular and plural forms both of verbs ‫נעשה(‬ versus ‫ויברא‬ and ‫)ברא‬ and of pronominal suffixes ‫בצלמנו(‬ and ‫כדמותנו‬ versus ‫)בצלמו‬ were used interchangeably. In view of the parallelism, ‫בצלמנו‬ from Genesis 1:26 should be explicated in the light of ‫בצלם‬ ‫אלהים‬ from Genesis 1:27. Thus, "our image", in which human beings were created, was that of ‫.אלהים‬ In the narrative there is also a natural transition from the singular to the plural concerning ‫אדם‬ that could denote either the individual person distinct from Eve and called Adam or both male ‫)זכר(‬ and female ‫)נקבה(‬ as indicated by Genesis 1:27. Therefore, in Genesis 1:26a God said "let us make ‫אדם‬ [...]" but in Genesis 1:26b God said with reference to ‫אדם‬ "let them rule ‫)וירדו(‬ [...]".
The Targum Onkelos 9 upheld the plural form of the verb in Genesis 1:26a, rendering Hebrew ‫נעשה‬ by means of Aramaic ‫.נעביד‬ Actually, in Hebrew verbs ‫עשה‬ and ‫עבד‬ could be synonyms. Furthermore, in the Targum Onkelos to Genesis 1:26 the plural pronominal suffixes on ‫צלם‬ and ‫דמו‬ ‫ת‬ were retained, while the Aramaic equivalents of both nouns were used with the same prepositions ‫ב(‬ and ‫,כ‬ respectively). The Targum Pseudo-Jonathan 10 followed the interpretation found in the Targum Onkelos, yet it elucidated Genesis 1:26 in theological terms by adding that God said "let us make [...] " to the angels that were created by him and that were ministering in front of him. Moreover, the Targum Pseudo-Jonathan used the Aramaic noun ‫)דיוקננא(‬ of Greek origin (δύο + εἰκών) 11 in place of ‫דמות‬ which could function both in Hebrew and in Aramaic and which was employed by the Targum Onkelos. Besides, the Targum to Psalm 39:7a translated ‫צלם‬ as ‫.דיוקנא‬ 12 Furthermore, in the Targum Pseudo-Jonathan the preposition ‫,כ‬ which occurs with ‫דמות‬ both in the Hebrew original and in the Targum Onkelos, is replaced with the Aramaic preposition ‫.ב‬ Thus, it seems that the Targum Pseudo-Jonathan viewed Hebrew ‫דמות‬ as synonymous with ‫צלם‬ because ‫בדיוקננא‬ was appositive to ‫.בצלמנא‬ Although no Jerusalem Targum to Genesis 1:26 is extant, the Jerusalem Targum to Genesis 1:27 casts light upon the preceding verse.
13 Accordingly, the act of creating human beings was attributed to the Word of the LORD ( ‫מימרא‬ ‫דײ‬ ), while human beings were created in the likeness ‫)דמות(‬ of the Word of the LORD, namely, in the "likeness from before the LORD". Such an interpretation articulated that the LORD used his Word as the instrument mediating between the intangible and the tangible, while creating the world and while acting in the created realm. This approach coincided with the Philonic concept of λόγος and it could be traced back to the biblical literature (e.g. ), God created the universe because ‫,ראשית‬ by means of which ‫)ב(‬ God was said to create the world, was identified with the Torah. Similarly, the Pirke attributed to Rabbi Eliezer 17 asserted that God said "let us make [...]", conversing with the Torah about his anticipated act of creating human beings. Consequently, the divine Wisdom (identical with the Torah) was construed as the LORD's instrument ( ‫כלי‬ ‫אומנותו‬ ‫של‬ ‫דקב״ה‬ ), as the agency which emanated from God and which represented God, yet without being independent of God in ontological terms. The Yalkut Shimoni 18 suggested that God might say "let us make [...]" either to the Torah or to the angels serving in front of him.
The ancient Greek versions of Genesis 1:26 preserved all plural features of the Hebrew original. 19 The Septuagint translated both prepositions (i.e. ‫ב‬ and ‫)כ‬ as κατά but the LXX revisions offered a more nuanced rendition. Aquila and Theodotion interpreted ‫ב‬ with ‫צלם‬ as ἐν ("in our image"), while Symmachus rendered it as ὡς ("as our image"). The Septuagint, Aquila and Symmachus translated ‫כ‬ with ‫דמות‬ as κατά, whereas Theodotion resorted to ὡς.
It is notable that a parallelism found in the Book of Sirach, which was a part of the Septuagint, illustrated how the image in which human beings were created, was understood in that Hellenistic Jewish text. In the light of the Book of Sirach (17:3) 20 the statement, that God created (ἐποίησεν) human beings according to his image (κατ᾿ εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ), meant that God clothed (ἐνέδυσεν), namely, endowed human beings with power (ἰσχὺν) according to himself (καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸν). Thus, the creation in accordance with God's image was the creation on the pattern of God himself, while this pattern conveyed a sense of divine power.
In the narrative Genesis 3:5 and Genesis 3:22 were interrelated because in the former passage the serpent enticed Eve to eat the fruit by saying that in consequence she and Adam would be like ‫)כ(‬ ‫אלהים‬ knowing ‫)ידעי(‬ good and evil, whereas in the latter passage God ( ‫ײ‬ ‫)אלהים‬ concluded that a human being became "like ‫)כ(‬ one ‫)אחד(‬ of us ‫.")ממנו(‬ In both verses there were plural forms ‫)ידעי (‬ or http://scriptura.journals.ac.za History of the Jewish Interpretation of Genesis 1:26, 3:5, 3:22 in the Middle Ages 5 serpent said to Eve: "it was evident in front of the LORD that [...]". Moreover, according to the Targum Onkelos, the serpent encouraged Eve to eat the fruit so that she and Adam would be like ‫)כ(‬ "the mighty" ‫)רברבין(‬ who knew the difference between ‫)בין(‬ good and evil. The Targum Pseudo-Jonathan coincided with the Targum Onkelos, yet specified that "the mighty" ‫)רברבין(‬ were the mighty angels ‫)מלאכין(‬ because the appellation ‫רברבין‬ was so generic that it might refer to any kind of human or angelic beings vested with authority and power. Additionally, both Targumim stated that "the mighty/angels" knew the difference between ‫)בין(‬ good and evil instead of saying that they simply knew good and evil because the direct knowledge of good and evil was reserved for God. The Septuagint 23 translated Genesis 3:5 literally, asserting that by eating the fruit, Adam and Eve were supposed to be "like gods" (ὡς θεοί) who knew (γινώσκοντες) good and evil. Consequently, it appears that the plural form of the participle ‫)ידעי(‬ in the Hebrew original of Genesis 3:5b impelled the LXX translators to parse ‫אלהים‬ in that verse as plural.
The Masoretic text of In principle, the interpretations cited above were seamless from a theological perspective because God did not say that Adam became ‫כאחד‬ ‫ממנו‬ but rather depicted Adam as unique ‫)יחידי(‬ in the world due to his ability to discern between good and evil. From Genesis 3:5 it appears that Adam acquired this ability by eating the fruit. Consequently, the Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and the Jerusalem Targum compared this unique position of Adam in the world to God's unique position in the heaven.
It seems that all the Targumim relied on the same grammatical presuppositions concerning the original text of Genesis 3:22 which might be reconstructed as follows. Firstly, ‫אחד‬ was construed as the absolute state and it was said to denote 'unique'. Secondly, ‫אחד‬ was linked to the infinitive ‫.)לדעת(‬ Thus, Adam either individually (as Adam) or collectively (as Adam's posterity) 29 became like the one who was to know good and evil. Thirdly, the preposition with the pronominal suffix ‫)ממנו(‬ was parsed as singular ("from him", "on his own", "by himself") 30 and it modified either the infinitive ‫)לדעת(‬ or the verb ‫.)היה(‬ Consequently, Adam became like the one who was to know good and evil, and either in this condition ‫)היה(‬ or in this knowledge ‫)לדעת(‬ Adam was self-reliant ‫)ממנו(‬ in the world. In other words, either Adam became by himself like the one who was to know good and evil, or Adam became like the one who was to know by himself good and evil. It should be noted that in Symmachus' revision (ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ) ‫ממנו‬ was interpreted in the same way as in the Targumim, while Greek ὁμοῦ might imply that Symmachus' revision took ‫כאחד‬ for the adverbial phrase. Indeed, ‫כאחד‬ vocalised ‫ָד‬ ‫ח‬ ֶ ‫ְּא‬ ‫,כ‬ not ‫ַד‬ ‫ְַּאח‬ ‫כ‬ (the received Masoretic vocalisation in Genesis 3:22), acted as the adverbial phrase denoting "together, totally or at once" in the Tanakh (2 Chronicles 5:13; Ezra 2:64, 3:9, 6:20; Nehemiah 7:66; Ecclesiastes 11:6; Isaiah 65:25).
29
This position additionally explicated ‫ממנו‬ in terms of the source ("from/out of Adam").
30
Grammatically speaking, ‫ממנו‬ could be parsed either as singular ("from him") or as plural ("from us"), depending on the context. http://scriptura.journals.ac.za History of the Jewish Interpretation of Genesis 1:26, 3:5, 3:22 
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Furthermore, the Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and the Jerusalem Targum mentioned that Adam as a prototype of humankind would originate countless future generations of human beings who could discern between good and evil. To emphasise that the direct knowledge of good and evil was reserved for God, both Targumim preferred to speak of "knowing how to discern between good and evil," which indicated that human beings could discern between these two but not necessarily penetrate them. Although the Jerusalem Targum facilitated the exposition of Genesis 3:22, it also attributed a new plural form ‫)נטרוד(‬ to God who referred to his own action in the plural ("we keep/let us keep"). Given that this new plural form did not occur in the Hebrew original, it might be an imitation of ‫נעשה‬ from Genesis 1:26. Thus, in the act of creation God said "let us make a human [...]", while in response to Adam's action, God said "let us keep a human away from the garden [...]".
References in the Midrashic and Talmudic Literature
Expounding Genesis 1:1, the grand Midrash on the Book of Genesis 31 safeguarded the unity of God and pointed out that ‫,אלהים‬ which could be parsed either as singular or as plural and which might denote either true/false God(s) or human/angelic agent(s) of power, depending on the context, referred to the one and only God in Genesis 1:1 because ‫אלהים‬ acted as the subject of the singular verb ‫,)ברא(‬ not the plural one ‫.)בראו(‬ Likewise, the grand Midrash 32 recalled that Genesis 1:27 read that God created ( ‫ויברא‬ ‫אלהים‬ ), not that gods created ( ‫ויבראו‬ ‫,)אלהים‬ humankind. Thus, there was only one divine authority/power ‫,)רשות(‬ not many ‫,)רשויות(‬ creating the universe. This hermeneutical presupposition determined the Midrashic interpretation of the plural forms which in Genesis 1-3 might refer to God.
Commenting upon Genesis 1:26, the grand Midrash 33 contended that the plural form "let us make [...]" signalled that God consulted ‫)נמלך(‬ someone or something, while creating the human race. Several answers to the question, whom God consulted, were recorded in the grand Midrash. According to the first interpretation, God consulted ‫)נמלך(‬ the works of heaven and earth, namely, the intangible 34 and tangible 35 creatures which were created prior to the creation of humankind. The grand Midrash mentioned that God could either consult all pre-human creatures at once or could consult creatures made on every single day prior to the creation of human beings. This process of consultation was compared to a political situation in which a king would not act without seeking advice from his counsellors.
According to the second interpretation, God consulted his own heart, namely, consulted himself while creating humankind because when human conduct disappointed God, in Genesis 6:6 God did not blame any proxy or contractor engaged in the work of creation but rather the LORD himself regretted creating human beings and the LORD himself held his own heart ( ‫אל‬ ‫לבו‬ ) accountable for the act of creation. According to the third interpretation, which was tinged with Platonising colour, God consulted preexisting souls of the righteous.
According to the fourth interpretation, God consulted the angels ministering in front of him, while creating human beings. Furthermore, the grand Midrash 36 considered how to explicate God's consultation with angels in the light of the LORD's sovereignty, because http://scriptura.journals.ac.za 8 Oseka
God was said to seek advice from beings (angels, to be precise) that were created by him and that were inferior and subordinate to him, albeit it would not be customary for superiors to seek advice from their inferiors. Therefore, the grand Midrash viewed God's consultation with angels as a token of the LORD's benevolence and humility, and clarified that while consulting angels, God did not ask for their permission to create humankind but rather requested their opinion without compromising his own authority and power to do whatever would please him.
As regards the creation of human beings in God's image, the grand Midrash 37 registered that the human race was created as a bridge between "upper" beings and "lower" beings, namely, between spiritual beings (i.e. God along with his angels) 38 and animals. Consequently, humankind would embrace both intellectual and physical attributes, and would be torn between immortality characteristic of the spiritual sphere, and mortality intrinsic to the physical sphere. Thus, human beings were created, on the one hand, in the image and likeness coming from the upper realm ( ‫מן‬ ‫העליונים‬ ), and on the other hand, in the image and likeness arising from the lower realm ( ‫מן‬ ‫התחתונים‬ ). In short, they were created as both intangible and tangible beings. The upper sphere, which might be called spiritual, intellecttual or celestial, knew neither reproduction nor death, while the lower sphere, which could be denominated as physical, animal or earthly, harboured both of these phenomena.
39
Therefore, it could be argued that according to the grand Midrash, the image, which God imprinted on human beings, consisted in both intangible and tangible features by virtue of which humankind could act as a bridge between heaven and earth. Thus, the image referred to in Genesis 1:26-27 was God's in the sense that God was the One who imprinted the image. In other words, the image, in which human beings were created, was that of God because God intentionally designed human identity to bridge both dimensions. This idea was adopted by the subsequent Jewish literature. 40 Moreover, the grand Midrash made other references to God's image/likeness. Explaining Genesis 2:18, the Midrash 41 stated that without female the likeness ‫)הדמות(‬ would be reduced which implies that the likeness referred to in Genesis 1:26-27 posited that humankind was created as male and female. Consequently, the full likeness could be predicated only of humankind defined as both male and female. 42 Besides, it transpires that in the Midrash the terms 'image' ‫)צלם(‬ and 'likeness' ‫)דמות(‬ were employed as synonyms.
Commenting upon Genesis 9:6, the grand Midrash 43 presented the idea which was also reflected in the Babylonian Talmud. 44 The image (identical with the likeness) was understood as God's collective representation in the world assigned to humankind. Thus, God created the human race to serve as his image in the world, namely, to represent him in the world. Therefore, by taking human life or by refusing to procreate, the image would Philo of Alexandria also noted that human body, which belonged to the material, visible world, was mortal, while the incorporeal dimension of human beings (called rational soul or mind), which reflected the ideal, invisible world, was immortal. Philo Alexandrinus, "De opificio mundi," 46-47 [46, 134-135] . http://scriptura.journals.ac.za
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decrease. Consequently, actions which expand or facilitate life, enhance the image, whereas actions, which terminate or suppress life, diminish the image. Clearly, the early Rabbinic tradition affirmed the human body as a part of God's design and recognised it as belonging to the image of God. 45 In the early Rabbinic tradition this image denoted, on the one hand, the tangible and intangible features which God imprinted on human beings, and on the other hand, the status and function of humankind that in its material (body) and immaterial (soul/spirit) aspects represented God in the world, namely, acted as the image of God in the world.
Such an approach to the image as to the intangible and tangible imprint left by God on humankind in its entirety corresponded to the Talmudic assertion 46 that the value of individual life ought to be the same as that of the community or even the same as that of whole humankind. Discussing this issue, the Babylonian Talmud 47 noticed that although the same image, which was imprinted by God on Adam, was also imprinted upon all subsequent generations of human beings, every single human being was unique and should be treated this way. Thus, both the unity and the diversity of the human race were duly acknowledged as a part of God's perfect design.
The ancient Jewish tradition treated Genesis 1:26 with caution and ventured to bring together two propositions which otherwise might be set against one another. On the one hand, God created the world through his Wisdom identical with his Word/Torah, and God could consult his heavenly court, more specifically, his angels, while creating humankind, and he might engage them as his proxies and agents, while creating human beings. On the other hand, God was the sole Creator of the universe so that the act of creation was his work, not that of angels. Therefore, any independent non-divine activity in or contribution to the act of creation was denied. God was to be affirmed as the only Maker of the world with no partner ‫)שותף(‬ in the work of creation. 48 Actually, the idea of more than one divine power or authority ‫)רשות(‬ involved in the act of creation was condemned in the ancient Jewish literature 49 and it was characteristic of the Gnostic tendencies penetrating both Judaism and Christianity in that period.
50
Balancing these two propositions was not an easy task. For instance, the grand Midrash 51 reported that in Genesis 1:26 God might consult pre-existing souls of the righteous and the possibility of such a consultation was illustrated with 1 Chronicles 4:23 which refers to workers ‫)היוצרים(‬ staying with a king and working for him. Christianity and Gnosticism (Leiden: Brill, 1977) . Gedaliahu G Stroumsa, "Form(s) of God: Some Notes on Metatron and Christ," Harvard Theological Review 76, no. 3, 1983:269-288. 51 ‫בראשית"‬ ‫",ספר‬ in ‫התורה‬ ‫על‬ ‫רבה‬ ‫,מדרש‬ 15v [VIII, 6 (Genesis 1:26)].
http://scriptura.journals.ac.za 10 Oseka acted as the king's agents and assistants. Moreover, the Midrash juxtaposed Hebrew ‫,היוצרים‬ which was derived from the root ‫,יצר‬ with the statement, that God made ‫)וייצר(‬ [the same root ‫]יצר‬ human beings, from Genesis 2:7. Since such an illustration, in which God was compared to an earthly king, while God's counsellors were compared to the king's workers, might imply that souls of the righteous were not only God's counsellors but also 'makers' ‫)היוצרים(‬ of humankind, the Midrash clarified that God ‫)הקב״ה(‬ only consulted them ‫)נמלך(‬ and that he himself created the world (  ‫וברא‬  ‫את‬  ‫העולם‬ ). Thus, theological limitations were placed on the comparison employed in the Midrash in order to uphold both propositions simultaneously.
The grand Midrash 52 interpreted the plural form ‫)ידעי(‬ in Genesis 3:5 in the light of the singular form ‫,)ידע(‬ of which ‫אלהים‬ was the subject in the same verse, in order to rule out any interpretation undermining God's absolute unity. The Pirke 53 attributed to Rabbi Eliezer 54 offered an interesting exposition of the phrase ‫ורע‬ ‫טוב‬ ‫ידעי‬ ‫כאלהים‬ in Genesis 3:5. Accordingly, ‫אלהים‬ in that phrase denoted true God, while the knowledge of good and evil was construed as the ability to do good and evil. Thus, the Pirke argued that the serpent tried to convince Eve that by eating the fruit, she could "be like God", namely, could acquire God's power to create and to destroy, to bring to life and to terminate life.
As regards Genesis 3:22 ‫ממנו(‬ ‫,)כאחד‬ the grand Midrash 55 listed three possible interpretations of that phrase. Firstly, ‫אחד‬ ‫ממנו‬ could refer to God cum his holy retinue. Secondly, in defiance of the received (Masoretic) vocalisation ‫ַד(‬ ‫ְַּאח‬ ‫,)כ‬ ‫אחד‬ was parsed as the absolute state, while ‫ממנו‬ was parsed as singular (literally: "from him", figuratively: "by himself, on his own"). Consequently, ‫אחד‬ was harnessed to the infinitive ‫)לדעת(‬ which was said to be modified by ‫.ממנו‬ All of this was supposed to produce the following meaning: "Adam became like the one who would know, namely, choose between good and evil by himself". Although the final rendition made sense in the context of the narrative, this reasoning was untenable in grammatical terms because ‫אחד‬ ‫ממנו‬ must be viewed as the partitive phrase ("one of us") and the syntax of Genesis 3:22 would not allow the preposition with the pronominal suffix ‫)ממנו(‬ to modify the infinitive ‫)לדעת(‬ instead of ‫.אחד‬ Thirdly, the grand Midrash epitomised the interpretation recorded in the Targum Onkelos and in the Targum Pseudo-Jonathan. According to this reading, owing to his knowledge of good and evil, Adam became unique in the world in the same way as God was unique in heaven. In other words, by acquiring the knowledge of good and evil, Adam became Godlike because he ultimately possessed the knowledge which was previously reserved for God. In addition, the Yalkut Shimoni 56 maintained that according to Genesis 3:22, Adam became like one of the angels ministering in front of God and endowed with the knowledge of good and evil.
The plural forms occurring in Genesis 1:26; 3:5 and 3:22 were examined in the Babylonian Talmud. In the case of Genesis 1:26, the tractate Sanhedrin 57 suggested that God said "let us make [...]" to his heavenly court, and it highlighted God's unity based on the fact that in Genesis 1:27 ‫אלהים‬ was the subject of the singular form of the verb ‫.)ויברא(‬ Thus, in Genesis 1:26 God contemplated and announced his intention of creating human- http://scriptura.journals.ac.za History of the Jewish Interpretation of Genesis 1:26, 3:5, 3:22 
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kind in the presence of his angels, whereas Genesis 1:27 reported that God's action had been accomplished. Since God said "let us make [...]" to the angels, "our image", in which humankind was created according to Genesis 1:26, was interpreted as the image both of God and of his angels. Consequently, the image denoted the features which were shared both by God and by the angels. The tractate Megillah 58 and the minor tractate of the Babylonian Talmud called Sofrim   59 implied that in Genesis 1:26 ‫נעשה‬ (let us make) should be interpreted as if God was the sole Maker ‫)אעשה(‬ [I will make]. In the case of Genesis 3:5, Sofrim 60 stated that the first ( ‫ידע‬ ‫אלהים‬ ) occurrence of ‫אלהים‬ was divine, namely, denoted true God, whereas the second one ( ‫כאלהים‬ ‫ידעי‬ ) was non-divine, yet no further specification was provided.
Mediaeval Jewish Exegesis
The early Jewish reception of the plural forms in Genesis 1:26, 3:5 and 3:22 defined the parameters of the subsequent Jewish interpretation of these phenomena. Explanations found in the Targumim and in the Midrashic and Talmudic literature were denounced as Jewish by the early church fathers. Justin 61 recapitulated and disapproved of several interpretations of the plural forms in Genesis 1:26, 3:22. These interpretations did not support the Christian trinitarian reading of such plural forms and were therefore rejected by Justin. Since Justin's account presented the mainstream Jewish positions circulating in the 2nd century accurately, it is relevant to the present research.
62
Consequently, Justin could not accept that God would say "let us make [...]" to himself, while deliberating and getting down to work. The proposition, that God said "let us make [...]" to the angels, engaging them in the work of creation as his agents, was also rebutted by Justin who asserted that even the human body could not be produced by the angels. Actually, the idea that the angels, who were defined as God's proxies and who could also be conceptualised as λόγος, created the material world including human corporeality, would be acceptable to Philo and could be argued from his writings. 63 Furthermore, Justin fended off the interpretation according to which God addressed classical elements (στοιχεῖα), such as earth, out of which the human body was created, when he said "let us make [...] ". This interpretation implied that God referred to the basic material elements, which had already been created by him, and that God used them to fashion the corporeal dimension of human beings. Thus, Justin epitomised the fundamental Jewish interpretations which must have been circulating and widespread in his lifetime. In fact, his own distinctively Christian exposition rested on the Jewish tradition, though clearly contravening the tenets of Judaism. Justin exploited the concept of divine σοφία (as typified by the LXX version of Proverbs 3:19) with which God conversed in the act of creation and through which God created the , 1957:420-437. 63 See the footnote no. 2 in the present article.
http://scriptura.journals.ac.za 12 Oseka universe, according to the Jewish tradition. Contrary to the Rabbinic consensus, Justin invested this divine σοφία with the independent ontological status and claimed that σοφία manifested itself in and through Jesus to such an extent that God's wisdom could be embodied in Jesus and identified with Jesus. Saadia Gaon ‫גאון(‬ ‫)סעדיה‬ expounded on Genesis 1:26-27 64 as well as Genesis 3:5 and 3:22. 65 In his opinion, the plural forms in Genesis 1:26 implied no plurality on the Creator's side but rather emphasised the majesty in a way which was typical of the Hebrew language. Thus, the plural in such expressions as "let us make" ‫)נעשה(‬ or "let us work" ‫)נפעל(‬ did not have to render the subject plural. To illustrate his point, Saadia referred to Numbers 22:6, 66 Judges 13:15 67 and Daniel 2:36 68 where in the direct speech the singular subject applied plural forms to itself very naturally.
Furthermore, Saadia avowed that humankind was created not by angels but rather by the LORD in his image which, for Saadia, did not indicate any corporeal resemblance between God and human beings. Rather, God created humankind in his image in the sense that he recognised and authenticated the dignity and significance of human beings as his creatures and declared them to be his most treasured possession. Consequently, by creating humankind in his image, God owned up to his perfect and beloved design. Saadia equated the image (referred to in Genesis 1:26-27) with the form or shape ‫)צורה(‬ and pointed out that although there were many different shapes in the world, God encompassed all of them. Therefore, when God acclaimed one of the shapes as his own, he acknowledged the unique and unprecedented status of this shape in his eyes. According to Saadia, humankind was the shape favoured by God as his image. In Genesis 3:5 Saadia interpreted ‫אלהים‬ in the phrase ‫ורע‬ ‫טוב‬ ‫ידעי‬ ‫כאלהים‬ as angels 69 and translated it as angels in his Arabic rendition of the Pentateuch. 70 Besides, Saadia explicated God's statement in Genesis 3:22 as follows: "Behold, Adam has already been made like one of us [endowed] with the knowledge of good and evil".
71
Rashi's ‫)רש״י(‬ treatment of the plural forms in the aforementioned passages did not offer any coherent strategy of interpretation but rather relied on the Targumic and Midrashic  solutions. 72 Thus, on the one hand Rashi followed a mental shortcut according to which humankind was created in the image of angels, on the other hand, he affirmed that the image, in which human beings were made, was that of their Creator because God himself created humankind as alluded to in Psalm 139:5. In Rashi's opinion, God was so humble that he would regularly consult the heavenly court (more specifically, the angels) surrounding him as exemplified by 1 Kings http://scriptura.journals.ac.za History of the Jewish Interpretation of Genesis 1:26, 3:5, 3:22 
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God indeed consulted his heavenly court and therefore he said to his angels "let us make [...] ", yet no one assisted God in the work of creation because the LORD alone created humankind. Furthermore, Rashi admitted that God's exemplary humility might be misperceived as if the superior (i.e. God) needed to win inferiors' (i.e. angels') approval or permission to take any action. Consequently, God addressed the angels by saying to them "let us make [...]" but God did not invite them to join him in the work of creation which in the light of Genesis 1:27a ( ‫ויברא‬ ‫אלהים‬ ‫את‬ ‫האדם‬ ‫בצלמו‬ ) was performed by God alone, not by multiple agents ‫.)ויבראו(‬ Rashi's interpretation of Genesis 3:5 was equivocal because in his view, to become "like ‫אלהים‬ knowing good and evil" meant to become "like makers of the world". This might suggest the emphatic reading of ‫אלהים‬ in that verse which could be traced back to the Pirke attributed to Rabbi Eliezer. 73 As regards Genesis 3:22, Rashi paraphrased the Targum Pseudo-Jonathan 74 and wrote that human beings were unique among earthly (visible) beings just as God was unique among heavenly (invisible) beings. Moreover, Rashi clarified that the unique status of humankind among other earthly creatures consisted in the knowledge of good and evil which was acquired by human beings but which was alien to animals. However, it unclear whether God's unique status consisted in the same knowledge of good and evil as obtained by human beings (because of their consummation of the fruit) or was due to the fact that God was the sole Creator of all visible and invisible beings.
Commenting upon Genesis 1:26-27, Samuel ben Meir ‫)רשב״ם(‬ 75 maintained that God said "let us make [...]" to his angels in the same way as he consulted his heavenly court in 1 Kings 22:19-22 and in Job 1:6. Rashbam pointed out that in Isaiah 6:8 the LORD spoke of himself both in the singular ‫)אשלח(‬ and in the plural ‫)לנו(‬ to highlight his majesty. In Rashbam's opinion, human beings were created in the image of angels and the likeness, which was imparted to humankind in the act of creation, equipped human beings with the wisdom ‫)חכמה(‬ which differentiated them from animals. It seems that since the proposition that human beings were created in the image of angels, did not conform to Genesis 1:27a ‫,)בצלמו(‬ Rashbam resorted to the Platonising interpretation according to which a human being was created "in his/her own [i.e. human] image", namely, in line with the incorporeal, abstract idea of humankind which mirrored the angelic world.
In his commentary on the Book of Genesis Abraham ibn Ezra ‫עזרא(‬ ‫אבן‬ ‫)אברהם‬ 76 dealt with theological, exegetical and grammatical questions. In theological terms, Abraham ibn Ezra opined that God said "let us make [...] " to the angels and that human beings were created by God in the image of angels. In his view, the plural forms occurring in Genesis 1:26 and in Genesis 11:7 ‫נרדה(‬ and ‫)ונבלה‬ indicated that the LORD addressed his angels. Therefore, according to Abraham ibn Ezra, ‫אלהים‬ in ‫כאלהים‬ ‫ידעי‬ ‫טוב‬ ‫ורע‬ (Genesis 3:5) and ‫ממנו‬ in ‫כאחד‬ ‫ממנו‬ (Genesis 3:22) denoted God along with his angels. Besides, Abraham ibn Ezra surmised that the LORD's statement in Genesis 3:22 might be God's account of what Adam aspired to be, as a result of his consummation of the fruit, given that Adam took the serpent's promise (Genesis 3:5) at face value.
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‫אליעזר‬ ‫רבי‬ ‫פרקי‬ ‫, ספר‬ 19 [XIII, 12] . Ultimately, God was the One who designed humankind to act as a bridge between heaven and earth, and to unite the intangible and the tangible.
From Joseph and David Kimhi's perspective, at the same time, God said "Let us make [...] " to the angels because human beings were predestined to take part in the intangible sphere which was common to spiritual (i.e. incorporeal) beings, namely, common to God and his angels. Explaining the concept of the image and likeness encountered in Genesis 1:26-27, Joseph and David Kimhi acknowledged that in the Hebrew Scriptures ‫צלם‬ and ‫דמות‬ might signify material (physical) 101 or immaterial (spiritual) 102 correspondence (resemblance), yet they placed theological limitations upon the plural pronominal suffixes occurring with ‫צלם‬ (" [our] image") and ‫דמות‬ (" [our] likeness") in this passage.
In their opinion, the plural form of the suffixes was caused by the plural form of the verb ("Let us make [...]") and it did not indicate that human beings were created in the image (likeness) both of the intangible sphere (common to God and his angels) and of the tangible sphere (videlicet, the basic elements created by God). In fact, the early Jewish tradition acclaimed both human body and human soul as God's image and likeness, 103 while the grand Midrash on the Book of Genesis implied that the image (likeness), which was God imprinted on humankind, reflected both dimensions and that the image (likeness) was God's in the sense that God was the sole Designer thereof.
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To the contrary, Joseph and David Kimhi argued that if God said "Let us make [...]" towards his angels, "our image and our likeness" must denote only the spiritual features shared by God and his angels on the stipulation that although both God and angels were spiritual (incorporeal) beings, God was the Creator, while angels were merely his creatures. Thus, the phrase "in our image and in our likeness" meant that some of these spiritual features were bestowed by God upon human beings in the act of creation. It seems that Joseph and David Kimhi upheld both propositions at the same time, teaching that God said "Let us make [...]", on the one hand, to the basic elements, on the other hand, to his angels, yet only the latter (scilicet the angelic reference) was used to explain the plural suffix on ‫צלם‬ in order to exclude non-spiritual features from the image.
In Joseph and David Kimhi's view, the image and likeness did not consist in any physical correspondence but rather in the intelligence ‫)שכל(‬ with the aid of which ( ‫בית‬ ‫העזר‬ ) God created humankind and with which ( ‫בית‬ ‫כלי‬ ) God equipped human beings. For Joseph and David Kimhi, the preposition ְּ ‫ב‬ (called simply ‫)בית‬ with ‫צלם‬ (" [our] image") in Genesis 1:26 performed both functions at the same time, namely, implied that God used the divine intelligence ‫)שכל(‬ as his tool ( ‫בית‬ ‫העזר‬ ) to create humankind and that God furnished human beings with this divine intelligence ( ‫בית‬ ‫כלי‬ ). In other words, God created the human race through the image defined as certain spiritual features (shared by God and his angels) and God imparted this image (i.e. features in question) to human beings. Consequently, the creation of humankind as both physical and spiritual beings could be perfected and brought to completion. Analysing ‫כדמותנו‬ in Genesis 1:26, Joseph and David Kimhi clarified that the preposition ְּ ‫כ‬ conveyed a sense of correspondence which in this instance must be only partial, not full, because human beings participated only in some spiritual features common to God and his angels.
